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say, I am solely responsible for opinions and all remaining errors.In this Review, Segerstrom (1998) modi…es Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) R&D-
based growth model (hereafter GH) in order to reconcile it with Jones’s (1995a) empirical
evidence which shows no “scale e¤ects” in growth. Segerstrom’s main idea is that R&D
becomes progressively more di¢cult over time, o¤setting the e¤ect of population growth.1
In this note, we …rst argue that while this idea is intuitively appealing, it is incor-
porated in a rather ad hoc manner and generates an unrealistic implication. Second,
and more importantly, we generalize Segerstrom’s model, parameterizing the elasticity of
substitution between any two consumption goods. That is, Segerstrom’s Cobb-Douglas
with perfect substitutes (CDS) preferences is generalized to the Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (Dixit-Stiglitz type) with perfect substitutes (CESS) preferences.2
Generalization yieldsstrikingresults. First, positiveand normative resultsin Segerstrom
are overturned, e.g. under certain conditions it is globally optimal to subsidize R&D.
This arises because …rms’ pricing decisions di¤er depending on whether the CESS or
CDS preferences are assumed. Second, it is shown that Segerstrom’s idea of R&D being
progressively di¢cult is fully compatible with the GH model with scale e¤ects. A crucial
assumption for removing scale e¤ects turns out to be diminishing returns to the knowledge
accumulation in R&D technology – the same assumption used in Jones (1995b).
1 Segerstrom’s Assumption of R&D
Segerstrom uses X (t) to denote an R&D di¢culty index. The Poisson arrival rate of
an innovation is I (t) = ALI (t)=X (t); A > 0; which decreases in X (t) and increases in
researchers LI (t): Segerstrom assumes that X (t) grows at a rate proportional to I (t):
1Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch.12) also stress this idea in eliminating scale e¤ects.
2The CDS preferences were …rst introduced by Segerstrom, et al. (1990).
1Now suppose that an entrepreneur invests in R&D at time t and successfully invents
the state-of-the-art product at t + dt: The di¢culty index rises to X (t + dt) > X (t),
since I (:) > 0 (i.e. LI > 0) for the time period dt: This makes perfect sense, as current
research success makes future R&D more di¢cult (e.g. computer chips).
Next suppose that no innovation has occurred for T years. The di¢culty index is now
X (t+ T) > X (t), since I (:) > 0 (i.e. LI > 0) for T years. That is, continual failures to
innovate render the identical R&D project more di¢cult! This is simply counter-factual.
Causality should run in the opposite direction; a more di¢cult R&D project causes more
failures at least on average.
The problem of Segerstrom’s di¢culty index is that it e¤ectively depends on the
accumulation of the number of R&D workers who are employed, irrespective of research
success or failure. A more plausible assumption is that the di¢culty index depends only
on the past successful innovations. We implement this assumption in the following section.
2 Generalization: CESS Preferences
We maintain Segerstrom’s notations and assumptions unless otherwise stated.
2.1 Consumers and Workers
The number of workers is given by L(t) = L0ent where L0 denotes the population at t = 0






















; 1 > ® > 0; ¸ > 1; (1)
where the dependence of j on ! in ¸
j! is made explicit. The CDS preferences used in
Segerstrom (and GH) is a special case in which ® = 0:
2From (1), the demand function for the product with the lowest quality-adjusted price
















and other goods in the same industry are not consumed. As in Segerstrom, the intertem-
poral utility maximization yields _ c(t)=c(t) = r (t) ¡ ½:
2.2 Product Markets










c(t): Clearly, d(j;!;t) is purchased (i.e. gives a
higher utility) if and only if it has the lowest-quality adjusted price, i.e. p(j;!;t)=¸
j! ·
p(j ¡ 1;!;t)=¸
j!¡1 or p(j;!;t) · ¸p(j ¡ 1;!;t) where p(j ¡ 1;!;t) = 1: Thus, given
that the demand function (2) has the price elasticity of ¡1=(1 ¡ ®); a top-quality …rm
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> > > :
1=® for 1=® < ¸ (drastic innovation)
¸ for 1=® > ¸ (non-drastic innovation).
(3)
Innovation is drastic for1=® < ¸ in the sense that …rms’ price decisions are not constrained
by potential competition from previous incumbent producers. In contrast, innovation is
always non-drastic in Segerstrom, since ® = 0: This di¤erence has important implications
for welfare analysis below. The quality leader earns










where Q(t) is equivalent to the average quality across industries.3
3Note that there are two types of the business-stealing e¤ects. Following innovation in industry !;
the former quality leader in the same industry loses all of its pro…ts. At the same time, pro…ts of …rms
32.3 R&D Races
Any R&D …rm i that uses `i workers in industry ! will succeed in generating the (j + 1)th
innovation with instantaneous probability of
A`i
¸"(j!+1)Q(t)
Á; 1 > Á > 0: This assumption
has several features worth mentioning. First, if ® = 0 (i.e. " = 0); it is reduced to A`i;
which is essentially equivalent to the R&D technology used by GH. Segerstrom simply
modi…es this into A`i=X (!;t) where X (!;t) is his di¢culty index that grows at a rate
proportional to
P
i A`i=X (!;t): Second, ¸
"(j!+1) is our di¢culty index and depends only
on the e¤ects of the past successful R&D, unlike Segerstrom’s.4 Third, Q(t)
Á represents
the positive knowledge spillover e¤ect across industries. Fourth, 1 > Á > 0 captures
Jones’s (1995b) idea that R&D technology exhibits diminishing returns to knowledge
accumulation.
Let v(j + 1;!;t) denote the expected discounted pro…t for inventing the (j + 1)th




free entry leads to





for all !: This condition makes entrepreneurs indi¤erent to any R&D projects.
The value of innovation isde…ned by the “no-arbitrage”condition ¼ (j;!;t)=v(j;!;t)+









Note that (i) equation (5) implies _ v(j;!;t)=v(j;!;t) = ¡Á _ Q(t)=Q(t); since ¸
"(j!+1)
is …xed from the viewpoint of entrepreneurs and investors, and (ii) from (4) and (5),
in other industries fall due to an increase in Q(t):
4A similar speci…cation is used in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch.7).
4¼ (j;!;t)=v(j;!;t) = (1 ¡ µ)AL(t)c(t)=Q(t)
1¡Á for all j and !: Therefore, the above
no-arbitrage condition implies I (j;!;t) = I (t) for all j and !; so that it can be re-
expressed as






1¡Á for all j and !: (7)
2.4 The Labor Market and Q(t)
The total employment of research workers is derived from (6): LI (t) =
R 1
0 LI (j;!;t)d! =
¸"I(t)Q(t)1¡Á
A ; as I (j;!;t) = I (t): Employment in the manufacturing sector is given by
D(t) =
R 1
0 d(j;!;t)d! = µL(t)c(t): Thus, the labor full-employment requires






A key variable in this model is Q(t). Note that quality improvement ¸
"(j!+1) ¡ ¸
"j!











" ¡ 1)I (t)Q(t) (9)
where the second equality uses (6) (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, p.260).
2.5 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
First de…ne x(t) = Q(t)
1¡Á =L(t): Equations (7) and (8) imply that x(t) must be con-






5Given I (j;!;t) = I, (6) implies that industries which have in the past experienced more innovations
devote relatively more resources to R&D. Thus, although the patent rate is the same across industries,
R&D employment levels change stochastically around the average over time.
5Besides, (1) is reduced to u(t) = µcQ(t)







In Segerstrom, equation (10) is replaced with I = n=¹ where ¹ is a parameter, and a
higher¹ acceleratesan increase in his R&D di¢culty index. In ourmodel, ¹ isendogenized
in terms of technology parameters, (1 ¡ Á)(¸
" ¡ 1). Another interesting di¤erence lies in
utility growth, which is increasing in ¸ in Segerstrom (see equation (19) of his paper)
but is independent of ¸ in our model (equation (11)). Segerstrom mentions a possible
extension of endogenizing utility growth through endogenizing ¸. Our model suggests
that such an extension endogenizes the rate of technical progress but not utility growth.
















x + µc: (13)
A …gure depicting these two conditions is essentially identical to Figure 3 of Segerstrom.6








´; where ª =
½
n
(1 ¡ Á) + Á > 1: (14)
Segerstrom …nds that this share is monotonically increasing ¸; because innovation is
always non-drastic, and as a result, a higher ¸ means a higher monopoly mark-up with
a greater incentive for R&D. In our model, in contrast, k is increasing in ¸ for ¸ < 1=®
but decreasing for ¸ > 1=® due to two opposing e¤ects. The monopoly mark-up e¤ect




¸¡1 for ¸ < 1=®. But this e¤ect disappears for ¸ > 1=®.
The second e¤ect arises from increasing di¢culty of R&D and is captured by 1=¸
". A
6One can easily establish that equilibrium is saddle-path stable.
6higher ¸ means a lower arrival rate of the next innovation, which tends to reduce the
R&D incentive. This e¤ect is dominated by the monopoly mark-up e¤ect for ¸ < 1=®:
This result has important implications for welfare analysis below.
Following Segerstrom, we explicitly introduced the idea that R&D becomes more dif-
…cult. However, this assumption is not su¢cient to eliminate scale e¤ects. To show this,
consider the case of n = 0 and Á = 1; which is essentially equivalent to the case of GH.
Solving the model, it is easy to verify that R&D intensity is now given by
I =
(1 ¡ µ)AL0 ¡ µ½
¸
" ; (15)
which is strictly increasing in L0 for (1 ¡ µ)L0A > µ½:7 This suggests that a key to
eliminating scale e¤ects is not the assumption of R&D becoming more di¢cult per se.
Scale e¤ects can be eliminated if and only if 1 > Á > 0. This is the same assumption used
by Jones’s (1995b) variety model.8 In this sense, our model shows a sharp parallel between
R&D-based growth models with quality innovations and those with variety innovations.
2.6 Social Optimum
Next we compare the market and socially optimal outcomes. Appendix A shows that (i)
the optimal R&D intensity is the same as (10), and (ii) the optimal share of R&D workers




" ¡1)I: (15) is comparable with equation (13) of GH (p.50).
8In Jones (1995b), R&D technology is given by _ N = LINÁ; 1 > Á > 0; where N is the number
of varieties. Given LI, frequency of innovation, _ N; increases over time, since N rises. (R&D becomes
progressively more di¢cult if and only if Á < 0:) Thus, Jones’s assumption is essentially di¤erent from
Segerstrom’s assumption of increasingly di¢cult R&D, since the industry-wide frequency of innovation









Somewhat surprisingly, kS is independent of the size of an innovation ¸:
Figure 1 depicts (14) and (16). If k > kS at ¸ = 1=® (the dotted line), it is optimal




and to subsidize it otherwise. On the other hand, if k < kS
at ¸ = 1=® (the solid line), R&D should always be subsidized. When does this case













An R&D subsidy is globally optimal if (i) knowledge accumulation exhibits su¢ciently
small diminishing returns, (ii) consumers are su¢ciently patient, (iii) population grows
su¢ciently fast, or (iv) the elasticity of substitution of variety goods is su¢ciently large.9
The intuition behind this result can be gained by identifying the individual externality
e¤ects in the utility metric in (1) (see Appendix B). First, the positive consumer-surplus











knowledge spillover e¤ect within and across industries and the negative intertemporal
spillover e¤ect due to increasing R&D di¢culty which is industry-speci…c (the latter e¤ect
dominates, as the sign is negative). Third, the negative creative destruction e¤ect within
and across industries is represented by ¡1¡µ
µ
¢
n: Fourth, there is no monopoly distortion
e¤ect, given the CESS preferences. For k > kS at ¸ = 1=®; the combined negative




, and the reverse








= ¡1 and IS ¡ I is (i)
monotonically increasing in ¸ or takes a \ shape for ¸ < 1=®; and (ii) monotonically increasing in ¸ for
¸ > 1=®; indicating several possibilities. For example, if IS > I at ¸ = 1=®; it is optimal to tax R&D for
a small ¸ but to subsidize it for a large ¸: These results di¤er from GH where R&D should be taxed for
a small and large ¸, but subsidized for an intermediate range.
8holds otherwise. For k < kS at ¸ = 1=®; the positive externalities always dominate
irrespective of the value of ¸. This happens if, e.g., ½ is su¢ciently low.
In Segerstrom, it is optimal to subsidize R&D for a small ¸ and to tax it for a large
¸. As we have demonstrated, his result is overturned in our more general framework.
9Appendix A: Social Optimum
We …rst consider the problem of the static labor allocation across consumption goods in-
dustries, taking total workers in manufacturing as constant. Dropping the time argument,
the social planner solves maxd(j;!) logu s.t. D =
R 1
0 d(j;!)d! where u is given in (1).

















for ! 6= !0: Substituting the latter expression into the denominator of the right-hand
side of the former equation yields d(j;!) = ¸
"j!=Q±. Substituting this back into D =
R 1
0 d(j;!)d! gives D = 1=±; which enables us to rewrite the above equation as d(j;!) =
¸"j!
Q D: Substituting this into (1) gives u = DQ
1
":
Using this result and de…ning z = D=L as the share of workers in manufacturing, the
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where » is a costate variable. By Pontryagin’s maximum principle,
1
1 ¡k












In steady state, (18) implies that _ » = 0, so that (19) becomes » =
´
½x: This in turn implies
_ x = 0 and leads to (10). Substituting » =
´
½x into (18) and using the resulting equation
and another equation from _ x = 0 generates (16).
10Appendix B: Identifying Externality E¤ects
This Appendix calculates the external e¤ects in the utility metric. Following GH and
Segerstrom, we consider that an external agent invents an extra innovation in an industry
! and its associated pro…ts disappearfrom the system(see GH and Segerstromfor detailed
explanations).
First de…ne © =
R t
0 I¿d¿; so that lnQ = (¸
" ¡ 1)© from (9). An extra innovation is
represented by an in…nitesimal increase in ©. Second, rewrite the consumption index as
u =
µ
LEQ1=": Using these equations, the impact of an increase in © on the intertemporal



















The …rst integral is reduced to ¸"¡1
"(½¡n); which measures the consumer-surplus e¤ect. The
second integral incorporates other external e¤ects.
Note that the income identity is E = L + ¦ ¡
¸"I
A Q1¡Á where ¦ is aggregate pro…ts
and ¸"I
















The …rst term captures the negative business-stealing e¤ect within and across industries.
The second term combines the positive knowledge spillover e¤ect and the negative in-
tertemporal spillover e¤ect due to increasingly di¢cult R&D.
Through the income identity with ¦ = (1 ¡ µ)E; there is a multiplier e¤ect on E
through ¦ as © rises, which is captured by (1 ¡µ)
dE
d©: In addition, pro…ts which accrue to
the external agent disappears from the system. First, (1 ¡µ) ¸"j!
Q E is lost in an industry
where an innovation occurs. Second, as an extra innovation raises Q; pro…ts of producers








11Note that the impacts of these e¤ects on welfare are proportional to ¸
"j!. Note also that
research costs for all these varieties were proportional to ¸
"j!: Therefore, “true” impacts
on welfare of a rise in © are obtained by de‡ating those losses by ¸
"j!: Moreover, these
negative welfare e¤ects last only until another innovation occurs in an industry !. Given
that the probability of the welfare losses remaining is e¡It; overall changes in aggregate








































" ¡ 1): (B.4)
Substituting this back into (B.1), evaluating the second integral and rewriting the resul-























: The …rst term on the right-hand side represents the negative creative
destruction e¤ect, and the second term captures both the positive knowledge spillover
e¤ect and the negative intertemporal spillover e¤ect due to increasingly di¢cult R&D. In
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